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INTRODUCTION 
 
The United Kingdom Supreme Court has recently handed down the much 
anticipated judgment in R (Barkas) v North Yorkshire County Council1 
(“Barkas”). The case addressed the “by right” defence in village green law 
and whether use that is pursuant to a statutory right could be use “as of right” 
for the purposes of village green registration.  
The court unanimously ruled that use “by right” could not be considered 
as use “as of right” and would not be qualifying use for the purposes of 
registration. Use will be “by right” when it is pursuant to a statutory right to 
use the land, and is usually engaged when the land in question is in public 
ownership. In reaching this judgment the court overruled the previous 
authority of R (Beresford) v Sunderland City Council2 (“Beresford”). 
The Supreme Court left many questions unanswered, although the 
culmination of recent activity in village green law now makes it considerably 
harder to register new greens. The inability to protect recreational spaces 
through village green registration potentially makes this land available for 
development, thus tipping the balance in favour of the economic aim, at the 
expense of the social and environmental aims, of sustainable development.  
 
CONTEXT 
 
To understand the facts of Barkas it first important to understand the legal 
context in which they occur and the law surrounding village green 
registration. 
∗ Lecturer in Law, University of Buckingham at natalie.pratt@buckingham.ac.uk  
1 [2014] UKSC 31, [2014] 2 WLR 1360. 
2 [2003] UKHL 60, [2004] 1 AC 889. 
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Land can be registered as a town or village green (“TVG”) pursuant to s15 
Commons Act 2006 and previously under s22 Commons Registration Act 
1965. Under the Commons Act it must be shown that the land has been used 
as of right for lawful sports and pastimes, for a period of at least twenty years, 
by the inhabitants of a locality or neighbourhood within a locality. The key 
requirement is that the use must be “as of right”, which has been taken to 
mean the tripartite test of nec vi, nec clam and nec precario: that the use must 
be without force, without stealth and without the licence of the landowner.3 
The rationale behind these factors was explained by Lord Hoffmann in R v 
Oxfordshire County Council, Ex p Sunningwell Parish Council as being that 
every legal system needs rules of prescription that protect long established de-
facto enjoyment of land.4 Each of these three factors gives the landowner the 
opportunity to object to the use, if they opt not to do so then they are taken to 
have acquiesced in the use by the local inhabitants. It can therefore be seen 
that village green law is underpinned by the principles of prescription in 
English Law.5  
Village green registration confers rights of recreation upon the users of the 
land who are from the relevant locality or neighbourhood within a locality,6 
and has the practical effect of protecting the land as it cannot be used in a way 
that is inconsistent with these recreational rights. TVG law therefore seeks to 
promote the social value of land (arguably there are some environmental 
benefits of village green registration, but these concerns are directly addressed 
by other mechanisms through which land can be protected), often at the 
expense of the economic value that can be attached to open spaces. 
Registration of land as a village green is often used as an attempt to thwart 
development plans, to the extent it has been referred to as “being used as a 
weapon of guerrilla warfare against development of open land.”7  
Recent developments in village green law appear to have reversed this 
trend of prioritising the social aim and lean more towards favouring the 
economic dimension and development of open spaces. The Growth and 
3 R v Oxfordshire County Council, Ex p Sunningwell Parish Council [2000] 1 AC 335 
(HL), 350H (Lord Hoffmann).  
4 [2000] 1 AC 335 (HL), 349D. 
5 Village green law is described as being “traceable” to prescription by Patten LJ in 
Taylor v Betterment Properties (Weymouth) Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 250, [2012] 2 
P&CR 3 [36]. 
6 R (on the application of Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Mental Health NHS 
Foundation Trust) v Oxfordshire County Council [2010] EWHC 530, [2010] BLGR 
631 [80] (HHJ Waksmann QC). 
7 R (Lewis) v Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council and Another [2010] UKSC 11, 
[2010] 2 AC 70 [48] (Lord Walker). 
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Infrastructure Act 2013 amended the Commons Act 2006 to introduce 
additional bars to registration of land as a TVG. Section 15C now provides 
that registration will be barred where a trigger event under schedule 1A, 
which are all linked to planning applications, has occurred. There is a 
tremendous housing shortage in England and Wales and the sterilisation of 
potential development sites by village green registration is proving 
controversial. As Leslie Blohm QC has noted in a recent article, “[t]here is no 
innate superiority in land being held for recreation as opposed to land being 
held for housing, business transport or health... at any given time the 
community may require one rather than the other”.8 At this given time land 
protected for recreation is clearly not finding favour with Parliament and their 
perceived needs of the economy and society as a whole.  
 
FACTS 
 
Barkas concerned a playing field of some two hectares, known as 
Helredale playing field (“the Field”), situated in North Yorkshire and owned 
by Scarborough Borough Council (the “Council”). The Field was originally 
acquired in 1951 by the predecessor of the Council as part of a larger plot of 
land, extending to some fourteen hectares, pursuant to powers under s73(a) 
Housing Act 1936. The majority of this plot was subsequently developed into 
a housing estate with the Field being laid out and maintained as recreation 
grounds pursuant to s80(1) of the Housing Act 1936. The 1936 Act was 
subsequently repealed and re-enacted with amendments in 1957 and 1985 and 
by the time litigation commenced the land was now held under s12(1) 
Housing act 1985 which provides: 
 
A local housing authority may, with the consent of the Secretary of 
State, provide and maintain in connection with the housing 
accommodation provided by them under this Part- 
(a) Buildings adapted for use as shops, 
(b) Recreation grounds, and 
(c) Other buildings or land which, in the opinion of the Secretary 
of State, will serve a beneficial purpose in connection with the 
requirements of the persons for whom the housing 
accommodation is provided.  
 
The Field was surrounded by at least three estates that were developed as 
local authority housing and had four entrances that were open at all times, 
8 Leslie Blohm, “The ‘by right’ doctrine and village green applications - a response” 
[2014] 1 Conv 40, 51. 
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with signs advising dog owners to clear up after their dogs and keep them on 
leads. It was largely grass, with the exception of a hard surface path that 
crossed the field, which the Council maintained and marked out a football 
pitch on. For at least fifty the years the park had been used openly and 
extensively by the local inhabitants for recreation. 
In October 2007 an application was made on behalf of the Helredale 
Neighbourhood Council to North Yorkshire County Council, the relevant 
commons registration authority, to register the land as a TVG under s15 
Commons Act 2006.  
Section 15(2) Commons Act 2006 provides that land may be registered as 
a TVG where: 
 
(a) A significant number of the inhabitants of any locality, or of 
any neighbourhood within a locality have indulged as of right 
in lawful sports and pastimes on the land for a period of at 
least 20 years; and 
(b) They continue to do so at the time of the application.  
 
North Yorkshire County Council appointed Vivian Chapman QC to 
conduct an inquiry in order to determine the application. He reported in June 
2010 and determined that the use of the inhabitants had not been “as of right”, 
but rather “by right”,9 because the inhabitants had only used it for the purpose 
for which it was provided by the local authority in the exercise of its statutory 
powers. Accordingly, North Yorkshire County council rejected the application 
for registration and Christine Barkas, a member of the Helredale 
Neighbourhood Council, applied for judicial review of this decision.  
The application failed in the High Court10 before Langstaff J and the 
appeal to the Court of Appeal11 was dismissed by Sullivan LJ, with whom 
Richards and McFarlane LJJ agreed. Christine Barkas then appealed to the 
Supreme Court. 
 
ISSUE 
 
The issue before the Supreme Court was relatively basic:  
 
where land is provided and maintained by a local authority pursuant to 
section 12(1) of the Housing Act 1985 or its statutory predecessors, is 
9 To use the terminology of Sullivan LJ in the Court of Appeal, [2012] EWCA Civ 
1371, [2013] 2 All ER 69 [3].  
10 [2011] EWHC 3653 (Admin). 
11 [2012] EWCA Civ 1371, [2013] 2 All ER 69. 
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the use of that land by the public for recreational purposes “as of 
right” within the meaning of section 15(2)(a) of the Commons Act 
2006?12 
Lord Neuberger also helpfully explained key terminology and the “by 
right” principle in his speech at paragraph fourteen: 
 
“as of right” is, somewhat counterintuitively, almost the converse of 
“of right” or “by right”. Thus, if a person uses privately owned land 
“of right” or “by right”, the use will have been permitted by the 
landowner- hence the use is rightful. However, if the use of such land 
is “as of right”, it is without the permission of the landowner, and 
therefore is not “of right” or “by right”, but is actually carried on as if 
it were by right- hence “as of right”.  
 
For use to be “as of right”, and more specifically nec precario, it is 
required that the user be a trespasser. As soon as there is a pre-existing right to 
use the land then there can be no prescriptive acquisition of rights. The 
additional limbs of nec vi and nec clam require the trespasser to be peaceable.  
Section 12 Housing Act 1985 in itself does not technically confer any 
rights on the public to use the land. However, Sullivan LJ explains that: 
 
[m]ost statutes dealing with local authorities do not expressly confer 
rights on members of the public, they tend to impose duties upon the 
authority and thereby confer rights that are enforceable as a matter of 
public law.13 
 
Therefore the local inhabitants have a statutory right to use the land which 
has been appropriated for recreation because the local authority, in 
appropriating the land for this purpose, is under a duty to use it for this 
purpose until it is formally appropriated for an alternative purpose.  
 
DECISION  
 
Both Lord Neuberger and Lord Carnwarth (with whom Lady Hale, Lord 
Reed and Lord Hughes agreed) delivered fully reasoned speeches and 
dismissed the appeal of Christine Barkas. Although the land had been used for 
over twenty years it had not been used “as of right” but rather “by right” 
under s12(1) Housing Act 1985. The land will not be registered as a TVG.  
12 Barkas [12] (Lord Neuberger).  
13 Barkas Court of Appeal [2012] EWCA Civ 1371, [2013] 2 All ER 69 [42]. 
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Lord Neuberger explained that where land has been held under a statutory 
provision such as s12(1) Housing Act 1985 the public have always had a 
statutory right to use the land for recreation and therefore they use the land 
“by right”. They will not be trespassers and as such there can be no possibility 
that use “as of right” has taken place.14 In addition his Lordship indicated at 
paragraph twenty one that, assessed objectively, the reasonable local authority 
in this situation would have regarded any use by the local inhabitants as being 
pursuant to their statutory right to use the land for recreation.15 Following this 
there can be no question with regards to the acquiescence of the landowner: 
the landowner (the Council) could not prevent the use of the land because it 
would be unlawful to do so, a priori the landowner is unable to acquiesce in 
the use and it cannot be “as of right”.  
This principle is further explored at paragraph twenty four where Lord 
Neuberger states that:  
 
it is impossible to see how...in the absence of any unusual additional 
facts, it could be appropriate to infer that members of the public have 
used the land “as of right” simply because the local authority have not 
objected to their using the land...It would not merely be 
understandable why the local authority had not objected to the public 
use: it would be positively inconsistent with their allocation decision if 
they had done so.  
 
R (Beresford) v Sunderland City Council 
 
A major factor for the court to consider was the authority of Beresford, 
which concerned land that had been acquired by the Washington 
Development Corporation under the wide powers of the New Town Act 1965, 
and for no specific purpose. Section 3 of the Act granted the development 
corporation the power to “acquire, hold, manage and dispose of land and other 
property”, “to carry on any business or undertaking”, and “generally do 
anything necessary or expedient” for the purposes of the new town. 
Furthermore, s21(1) provided that: 
 
[a]ny land being, or forming part of, a common, open space... which 
has been acquired for the purposes of this Act... may... be used by 
14 Barkas [20]-[21]. 
15 An observation that has relevance following the indication of Lord Hoffmann in R v 
Oxfordshire County Council, Ex p Sunningwell Parish Council [2000] 1 AC 335 
(HL), 352H-353A that use “as of right” should be judged by “how the matter would 
have appeared to the owner of the land”. 
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them, or by any other person, in any manner in accordance with 
planning permission 
 
Section 4 New Towns Act 1965 defined “open space” as “any land laid 
out as a public garden, or used for the purposes of public recreation”. When 
the 1965 Act was repealed these provisions were replaced by the New Towns 
Act 1981 which had an identical effect. 
The facts summarised by Lord Walker at paragraph eighty-nine of 
Beresford detail that the land had been identified in the 1973 New Town Plan 
as an area for developing a sports centre that included a swimming pool, 
football pitch and running track. Entry to these facilities would be charged. 
The field was subsequently grassed over in 1974 and the public continued to 
use it for recreation, and in 1977 the development corporation organised for 
the maintenance of the grass and put benches on the land. The land was 
transferred to the Commission for New Towns in 1989 and was retained due 
to its potential for commercial development. When the land was finally 
transferred to Sunderland City Council in 1996 it was subject to the covenant 
that it would only be used for courts or community health, leisure or 
recreation facilities.  
Sunderland City Council, despite making no argument in relation to the 
provisions of the New Town Act 1965 and 1981, successfully argued that the 
land had been used by the public pursuant to a licence. This was overturned 
by the House of Lords which found that there was no express licence granted 
to use the land, and that there could be no implied licence without an “overt 
act which is intended to be understood , and is understood, as permission to do 
something that would otherwise be an act of trespass”.16 The court also 
invited counsel back to a further hearing to hear argument on whether the 
public had a statutory right to use the land for recreation, which the court then 
concluded that they did not. Lord Walker in particular had reservations over 
whether the land had been subject to a “formal appropriation...as a 
recreational open space”.17 The land in question was therefore registered as a 
TVG. 
The question for the Supreme Court in Barkas to determine was whether it 
should apply Beresford and find that the Field had been used “as of right” for 
the purposes of village green registration, or whether Beresford could be 
distinguished or overruled entirely.  
Lord Neuberger initially indicates at paragraph forty seven that Beresford 
could, and should, be distinguished from the issue in Barkas. This can be done 
on the basis that the Field in Barkas was acquired and maintained as a 
16 Beresford [75] (Lord Walker). 
17 Beresford [90]. 
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recreation ground under a specific statutory power. Conversely, the land in 
Beresford was not acquired or appropriated for any specific use. Indeed, the 
land was not even intended to be used for free public access as it had been 
identified as a site on which fee charging leisure facilities would be 
developed. As such, the use could not be characterised as “by right”. 
Lord Carnwarth however advocated that while the powers under the New 
Town Act 1965 were very wide there was a comprehensive statutory 
framework in place that addressed the concerns of Lord Walker regarding a 
“formal appropriation”. The powers were sufficient to make land available for 
public recreation pending further development. Furthermore, Lord Carnwarth 
questioned the comments of Lord Bingham18 and Lord Rodger19 in Beresford 
that suggested that encouraging the use of the land by maintaining it and 
providing benches would not be inconsistent with use “as of right”. His 
Lordship concluded that where the acts of encouragement were done by a 
local authority they “lend force to the...inference that they are done 
under...statutory powers”.20 
This position was also eventually adopted by Lord Neuberger later in his 
speech.21 Accordingly, Beresford was wrongly decided and should no longer 
be relied upon. It is however unclear whether this holds true for the entirety of 
the judgment, and thus the much relied on comments regarding the nature of 
implied licences in village green law, or whether it applies merely to the 
consideration of the “by right” issue.  
 
COMMENT 
 
Conceptual Uncertainty 
 
The tripartite test for use “as of right” is that the use must be nec vi, nec 
clam and nec precario. It is still unclear post Barkas as to whether use “by 
right” is a sub-species of precario or whether it forms a fourth vitiating factor 
itself. 
Traditionally the courts had little problem with conceptualising “by right” 
use as a sub-species of precario.22 This sentiment has now been somewhat 
18 Beresford [7]. 
19 Beresford [60]. 
20 Barkas [82] (Lord Carnwarth). 
21 Beresford [88]-[89]. 
22 See for example R v Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte Billson [1999] 
QB 374 (HC) where Sullivan J held that use of a common pursuant to s193 Law of 
Property Act 1925 would not be use “as of right” for the purposes of acquiring a 
prescriptive right of way because the use was by licence.  
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challenged by recent Court of Appeal decisions such as R (Newhaven Port 
and Properties Ltd) v East Sussex County Council23 where Richards LJ 
indicated that use pursuant to a statutory right should be characterised as “by 
right” rather than a sub-species of precario and use by licence.24 Furthermore, 
it was also expressly stated in the Court of Appeal proceedings in Barkas that 
there may be instances in which a fourth vitiating factor could be relevant.25  
The Supreme Court failed to give a definitive answer on the proper 
characterisation of use pursuant to a statutory right in Barkas. It was initially 
indicated by both speeches delivered that “by right” use should be considered 
as an element of precario use,26 however Lord Carnwarth then swiftly 
proceeds to frame his speech within an ““as of right/by right” dichotomy”.27 
His Lordship goes even further by asserting that the tripartite test is “not 
always the whole story. Nor is the story necessarily the same story for all 
forms of prescriptive right.”28 
It matters how this type of use is characterised because it informs our 
entire conceptual understanding of the village green. If the tripartite test is no 
longer sufficient to determine if a landowner, whether public or private, has 
acquiesced in the use of their land for lawful sports and pastimes then it is 
unclear what standard should be applied. It does not seem satisfactory to have 
such a level of ambiguity when rights over land (which is an import 
economic, social and environmental resource) are being determined. To say 
that the test is “not always the whole story” or not the same for all prescriptive 
rights leaves open the possibility of costly litigation to determine where the 
plot of this story ends. Such an assertion also unsettles an ingrained tradition 
of English law that spans back as far as Bracton29 and Coke.30 
 
Publically Owned Land 
 
It is clear that the possibility of registering local authority land as a village 
green has dramatically diminished with the acknowledgement that use 
pursuant to a statutory right will not amount to use “as of right”. It is however 
clear that public ownership of land will not automatically bar the acquisition 
of village green status, with cases such as Oxfordshire County Council v 
23 [2013] EWCA Civ 276, [2014] QB 186. 
24 Ibid [82]. 
25 Sullivan LJ [38]. 
26 Barkas [20] (Lord Neuberger), [51] (Lord Carnwarth). 
27 Barkas [58] (Lord Carnwarth). 
28 Barkas [58] (Lord Carnwarth). 
29 Bracton, Lib 2, f 51b, 52a, Lib 4, f 22b.  
30 Co Litt 11 3b.  
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Oxford City Council31 (“Oxfordshire”) evidencing this. The question therefore 
appears to be in what circumstances will land held by a local authority be 
used by the local inhabitants “by right” as opposed to “as of right”?  
The answer suggested by Lord Carnwarth in the Supreme Court is that for 
land to be used “by right” it must be “laid out or identified in any way for 
public recreational use”.32 If this is indeed the test it could still be submitted 
that the Field in Barkas does not fulfil it. Section 12(1) Housing Act 1985 
denotes three purposes for which the land may be held (buildings adapted for 
use as shops, recreation grounds and any other beneficial purpose) and 
therefore the land is not solely laid out for recreation. There is no need for a 
formal appropriation process between these three uses as the holding power of 
s12 is consistent (at most all that is needed is a “formal decision”33) and 
therefore the land is not deemed as being used for another purpose, or ceasing 
to be used for the statutory purpose for which it is held.34 This objection is 
partially nullified by the overruling of Beresford which now allows for use of 
the land to be “by right” even if it has been acquired under wide powers and 
for no specific use. It does however seem quite unsatisfactory that the use of 
the land can change provided that the new use is still within the scope of the 
same holding power. It is little wonder why local inhabitants try to register 
their recreational spaces as a TVG to secure better protection for their use 
rights.  
Where the distinguishing line lays between cases such as Oxfordshire and 
Barkas or Beresford is even harder to determine. It would appear that any 
appropriation of land under a statutory power, no matter how wide, will 
render the use “by right” provided that laying out the land for recreational use 
can be construed within the power. This would cover most public parks and 
land owned by local authorities, and it is probable that the land in Oxfordshire 
was only subject to a successful registration because some twenty five per 
cent of the surface area of the land is inaccessible; the local authority could 
hardly have laid this land out for recreation even if they had wanted to.  
It has recently been suggested that “[i]t would be going very far indeed to 
suggest that Parliament, as a matter of fact, intended public parks to fall 
within the TVG legislation.”35 This sentiment was shared by Lord Neuberger 
31 [2006] UKHL 25, [2006] 2 AC 674; see also Barkas [66] (Lord Carnwarth). 
32 Barkas [66]. 
33 Barkas Court of Appeal [2012] EWCA Civ 1371, [2013] 2 All ER 69 [42] 
(Sullivan LJ). 
34 Applying Sullivan LJ in Barkas Court of Appeal [2012] EWCA Civ 1371, [2013] 2 
All ER 69 [43]. 
35 Leslie Blohm, “The “by right” doctrine and village green applications- a response” 
[2014] 1 Conv 40, 51.  
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in Barkas.36 It can be argued that TVG registration cannot be reconciled with 
the power of local authorities to hold land for the purposes of recreation. 
Parliament allows local authorities to change the purposes for which they hold 
the land under the mechanism of s122 Local Government Act 1972 depending 
on the needs and interests of the local community at any given time. It would 
seem highly peculiar that this power could then be impeded simply because 
they had held the land for recreational purposes for the twenty years required 
for village green registration. 
  
Policy Considerations 
 
The decision of the Supreme Court in Barkas is another firm indication as 
to the policy concerns surrounding village green registration.  
Land that is registered as a village green is protected in the sense that it 
prevents any use of the land that is inconsistent with the recreational rights 
conferred on the local inhabitants. This hinders the economic value of the land 
and sterilises it in terms of development and commercial investment. The 
introduction of the “trigger events” that bar registration, as discussed earlier, 
will automatically preclude most attempts at registration when it is considered 
that a sizeable portion of applications have been to prevent development on 
open spaces.  
Local authorities holding land for the purposes of recreation, and the right 
of the public to use these, does not give the public the same permanence and 
stability of right that is conferred upon TVG registration. The flexibility in 
allowing for the appropriation of the land to an alternative use, which can no 
longer be defeated by village green registration, is more favourable to an 
expanding economy that is seeking to extract the maximimum economic value 
from natural resources such as land. Creating a class of land that cannot be 
registered as a village green makes available this valuable resource for 
purposes other than recreation.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
To summarise, there is still some uncertainty as to when it can be inferred 
that land has been appropriated and laid out for recreational use by the local 
authority. One thing is however abundantly clear: in an era of economic 
growth the “village green industry”37 is in decline. The additional protection 
36 Barkas [24]. 
37 R (Lewis) v Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council and Another [2010] UKSC 11, 
[2010] 2 AC 70 [48] (Lord Walker); see also Rowena Meager, “The ‘village green 
industry’: back in business” (2010) 69(2) CLJ 238. 
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afforded to local authority land post Barkas, coupled with the recent 
amendments to the Commons Registration Act 2006 by the Growth and 
Infrastructure Act 2013, clearly tips the balance in favour of the development 
of land and the economic aim of sustainable development.38 
38 Similar arguments are made in light of the decision in Adamson and others v 
Paddico (267) Limited [2014] UKSC 7, [2014] 2 WLR 300 see Natalie Pratt, “The 
application of the equitable doctrine of laches to the rectification of the town and 
village green register” [2014] 6 Journal of Planning and Environment Law 588, 595 
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